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NOTES 
Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the Commission of a 
Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination 
Limitations 
Persons on deferred sentence, probation, or parole1 who arguably 
violate the criminal law may face two proceedings: a hearing to 
revoke their conditional liberty and a criminal trial. The possibility 
of two proceedings raises at least two major constitutional questions. 
First, are the defendant's rights under the double jeopardy or due 
process clauses violated if the state holds two inquiries into the alleged 
criminal act? Second, is the defendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination abridged if the revocation hearing is held before the criminal 
trial? 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to delineate the constitu-
tional protections that have been accorded to persons on conditional 
liberty. Because, until recently, a grant of conditional liberty was 
considered an act of grace, 2 due process was not thought to mandate 
1. An individual on deferred sentence, probation, or parole is often released into 
society subject to great restrictions on his freedom of action. For example, an 
individual may be forbidden to drive a motor vehicle, drink alcohol, or marry. See 
generally R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGIB, AND CoN-
DmONS OF SENTENCE 100-21, 306-17 (1969). These restrictions however, must bear 
some rational relation to the attainment of the goals of the conditional liberty system. 
Cf. Howie v. Byrd, 396 F. Supp. 117 (W.D.N.C. 1975). 
When a defendant is placed on probation, a sentence is pronounced but then 
suspended, and the defendant is released. If the court later finds the conditions of his 
release violated, the original sentence is then executed, or, in some jurisdictions, a 
new sentence is pronounced. Compare Smith v. State, - Ind. -, 307 N.E.2d 281 
(1974) (increased sentence may be imposed on revocation), with Viel v. Potter, 20 
Conn. Supp. 173, 129 A.2d 230 (C.P. 1957), and Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 
S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1970) (unconstitutional to increase sentence upon revocation). A 
defendant placed on a deferred sentence is released subject to restrictions without a 
final sentence being pronounced. Only when the defendant violates the conditions of 
his release does the court, in a new hearing, set his sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3651, 3653 (Supp. 1975). A defendant is placed on parole only after he has 
served part of his sentence. Parole is administered by a parole board, an administra-
tive body, and not by a court. For a more complete discussion of the differences 
between probation and parole, see Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State 
Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. CoLO. L. REv. 197, 225-28 (1970); Van Dyke, 
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 
1215, 1239-43 (1971). 
Although for some purposes the differences among probation, parole, and deferred 
sentencing are important, see note 9 infra, here they are all subsumed under the 
rubric of conditional liberty. "Revocation" as used in this Note, then, describes the 
revocation of any of these three types of conditional liberty. 
2. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) ("Probation or suspension of 
sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime . . . ."). 
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a hearing before revocation.3 In Morrissey v. Brewer4 and Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 5 the Supreme Court rejected this privilege rationale. 
Focusing instead both on the "grievous loss" of liberty that revocation 
of conditional liberty entails6-the loss of employment and enjoyment 
of normal family life and friendships-and on the state's interest in 
treating the defendant with basic fairness, the Court required certain 
minimal protections for the defendant. 7 
It is clear, however, that the defendant in a revocation hearing 
need not be accorded the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution. 8 Although the Supreme Court has not clearly 
articulated the ways in which revocation hearings may differ from 
criminal trials, 9 the lower courts have indicated that in revocation 
3. At least three other theories were advanced to support the position that no 
procedural protections were required in hearings to revoke conditional liberty: (1) 
the defendant had "contracted" for bis conditional liberty and in so doing had 
consented to a summary revocation hearing; (2) the rehabilitative goals of the state, 
acting as parens patriae, coincided with the individual's own interest and therefore no 
procedural safeguards are needed to protect the individual; and (3) the defendant 
remained in "constructive custody" and therefore revocation of conditional liberty 
involved no substantial incursion on the defendant's freedom. See generally Note, 
The Impossible Dream?: Due Process Guarantees for California Parolees and Proba-
tioners, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 602, 604-09 (1974). Either implicitly or explicitly, all of 
these theories were rejected in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
4. 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole). 
5. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of probation). 
6. See 408 U.S. at 482; 411 U.S. at 781-82. 
7. The defendant must be provided some preliminary proceeding to determine that 
there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that a violation of a condition 
on which his liberty rests has occurred. 480 U.S. at 485; 411 U.S. at 782. Only 
after the existence of such reasonable ground is shown can a second hearing be held 
at which it is determined ( 1) whether the individual has violated the terms of the 
conditional liberty agreement and (2) whether the violation was serious enough to 
warrant termination of the conditional liberty. 408 U.S. at 479-80, 485; 411 U.S. at 
782, 784. Certain minimal procedural protections must be provided at this second 
hearing: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the 
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' bearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; 
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons 
for revoking parole." 408 U.S. at 488-89; 411 U.S. at 786. 
8. See 408 U.S. at 480; 411 U.S. at 781. 
9. See 411 U.S. at 789. 
The Supreme Court has treated parole and probation revocation similarly. In-
deed, in Gagnon, the Court noted that the two procedures are constitutionally 
indistinguishable. 411 U.S. at 782 n.3. The Court has not dealt explicitly with the 
general requirements of due process at a deferred sentencing hearing. However, since 
state and defendant interests involved in deferred sentencing are similar to those 
involved in parole or probation, it seems clear that the protections enunciated in 
Morrissey and Gagnon should apply to deferred sentencing hearings. 
The only potential distinction between deferred sentence hearings and probation 
or parole hearings is that counsel is clearly required at a deferred sentence revocation 
hearing, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), while right to counsel at parole or 
probation revocation hearings is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 411 U.S. 
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proceedings evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure10 
and hearsay evidence are admissible, 11 the opportunity to cross-
examine may be denied for "good cause,"12 and the state need not 
demonstrate the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.13 
at 790. This distinction at first seems important because of the relationship of the 
right to counsel with the right against self-incrimination. (See the discussion of 
compulsion in the text at notes 85-102 infra.) The significance of this distinction, 
however, is limited. This Note is concerned with the self-incrimination problems of a 
defendant who is contesting his guilt at the revocation hearing before full trial and 
therefore should be entitled to counsel. See 411 U.S. at 790. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States 
er rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Dowery, 20 
Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974), affd., 18 CRIM. L REP. 2268 (Nov. 25, 
1975); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174,304 A.2d 647 (1973). 
Courts have argued that, since the purpose behind suppression of such evidence is 
to deter unconstitutional police conduct, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
little is to be gained from suppressing this often highly relevant evidence at a 
revocation hearing. Using similar reasoning, at least one court has allowed the 
admission at a revocation hearing of a confession obtained in violation of the 
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Commonwealth v. 
Kates, 452 Pa. 102,305 A.2d 701 (1973). 
11. See Mays v. Nelson, 464 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Register, 
360 F.2d 689 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); State v. Hughes, 200 
N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1972). Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1967). 
But cf. People ex rel. Angell v. Lynch, 71 Misc. 2d 921, 337 N.Y.S.2d 556 (West-
chester County Sup. Ct. 1972), atfd., 45 App. Div. 2d 853, 358 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1974). 
12. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
"Good cause" has been found when no sworn testimony was used because certain 
admissions ha_d been made, see State v. Sanchez, 19 Ariz. App. 253, 506 P.2d 644 
(1973), when the complaining witness was never called because other ample evidence 
was offered, see Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973), and 
probably would be found if there were substantial danger to the witness, cf. Birzon v. 
King, 469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the right to confront and to cross-
examine witnesses probably cannot be totally abrogated. See State v. M.arlar, 20 
Ariz. App. 191, 511 P.2d 204 (1973) (sustaining challenge to revocation proceeding 
in which only evidence offered was hearsay and thus not subject to cross-examina-
tion); Mishel v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 73 Misc. 2d 207, 343 N.Y.S.2d 394 
(OnondagaCountyCt.1973) (same). 
13. See United States v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Lauchli, 427 F.2d 258 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 868 (1970); Amaya v. Beto, 
424 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 
1965). 
Formulations of the burden vary among the states. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 102 
Ill. App. 2d 14, 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969) (preponderance of the evidence); State v. 
Bettencourt, 112 R.1. 706, 315 A.2d 53 (1974) (reasonably satisfactory evidence); . 
Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974) (court must be reasonably 
satisfied that violation has occurred). In Colorado, when the act constituting a 
violation of conditional liberty is itself a crime, the state must show defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-206(3) (1973). In 
North Carolina the state may be required by common law to carry the criminal 
burden of proof in the revocation proceeding if a criminal proceeding is pending. See 
State v. Causby, 269 N.C. 747, 153 S.E.2d 467 (1967); State v. Guffey, 253 N.C. 43, 
116 S.E.2d 148 (1960). But cf. State v. Coffey, 255 N.C. 293, 121 S.E.2d 736 
(1961); State v. Greer, 173 N.C. 759, 92 S.E. 147 (1917). At least four state 
statutes arguably could be read to require that conditional liberty cannot be revoked 
for commission of a criminal offense unless defendant has been convicted of that 
offense and therefore also to require the higher burden of proof. See MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 277, § 72A (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-62 (Supp. 1974); WASH. R.Ev. 
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Revocation hearings are not required to be procedurally equiva-
lent to criminal trials for two reasons. First, the deprivation of 
conditional liberty that results from revocation is not as severe as the 
deprivation of absolute liberty that results from conviction of a 
crime.14 Second, both the state and the individual have an interest in 
ensuring that revocation hearings do not become overly adversarial 
and formal: As the Court emphasized in Gagnon, "[I]n the greater 
self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role in an adversary proceeding 
the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior 
and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive 
rehabilitation."15 Moreover, a relatively informal revocation pro-
. ceeding might be held earlier and more expeditiously than a criminal 
trial. The defendant who has not committed a violation can thus 
return quickly to the more normal life situation that the conditional 
liberty system assumes aids in rehabilitation.16 Furthermore, the 
state's financial costs are substantially reduced by not requiring for-
mal adversarial hearings.17 Finally, enabling a state to revoke condi-
tional liberty with relative ease may encourage it to grant conditional 
liberty in more cases, since it will be able quickly to terminate the 
experiment if an individual proves unable to handle this limited 
freedom.18 
In addition to its interest in an informal revocation proceeding, 
the state also has an interest in holding a separate criminal trial: 
Because the punishment obtainable in a revocation hearing must be 
within the range of permissible punishments for the first offense 
committed, 19 the state, in order to discharge its duty of societal 
protection, may need a criminal trial to obtain a punishment com-
mensurate with the severity of the second offense. 20 
CODE§ 9.95.120 (1974); W. VA. CODE .ANN.§ 62-12-19 (1966). 
The scope of review may differ depending on what body administers the revoca-
tion proceeding. Courts have been less willing to interfere with the determination of 
a parole board, an administrative body, than with the determination of a court in 
probation and deferred sentence revocation. Indeed, it has been suggested that parole 
board decisions are virtually unreviewable. See Fisher, Parole and Probation Revoca-
tion Procedures After Morrisey and Gagnon, 65 J. CRIM. L & CRIMIN. 46, 55-56 
(1974). 
14. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) ("Revocation deprives an in-
dividual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the 
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions"), 
Further, an individual's criminal record does not show a new conviction if condi-
tional liberty is revoked. R. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 365. 
15. 411 U.S. at 788. 
16. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,484 (1972). 
17. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,788 (1973). 
18. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,483 (1972). 
19. See authorities cited in note 1 supra. 
20. If the state is not able to conduct a criminal trial in addition to a revocation 
proceeding, a burden may be placed on the entire system of conditional liberty. If the 
state knows that upon revocation only one penalty may be obtained, it may be 
reluctant to grant conditional liberty at all. This reluctance is probably not a concern 
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From the above, it is clear that the state has a legitimate interest 
in holding both an informal revocation hearing and a formal criminal 
trial. Thus, it must be considered whether holding dual proceedings 
violates the fifth amendment's provision that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb."21 
The Supreme Court has held that this clause proscribes a second 
prosecution for the same offense both after acquittal22 and after 
conviction.23 The prohibition against prosecution after acquittal ren-
ders the status of innocence meaningful; without it no judge or jury 
could effectively acquit, while a single judge or jury could convict. 24 
This prohibition also protects against the use of successive prosecu-
tions to refine a case. 25 The prohibition against prosecution after 
conviction prevents the government from making repeated attei:µpts 
when the punishment available at a revocation hearing is significant, but it may be 
when the punishment available at the revocation hearing is insignificant because the 
first offense is a relatively minor one. This reluctance would be greatest in precisely 
the case in which conditional liberty should be extended most freely. 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause is binding on the states through the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-
96 (1969). 
It might be argued that revocation proceedings generally, without the possibility of 
later criminal trial, present double jeopardy problems: Because the restraint involved 
in conditional liberty itself constitutes punishment, cf. United States v. Korematsu, 
319 U.S. 432 (1943); United States v. Teresi, 484 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), 
subsequent incarceration upon revocation amounts to a second punishment. Such an 
argument strikes at the heart of any system of conditional liberty and courts have 
summarily rejected it. See, e.g., Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 
1970); United States v. Huggins, 184 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1950); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Thomas v. Myers, 419 Pa. 577, 215 A.2d 617 (1966); Valdez v. State, 508 
S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Some courts have found that conditional 
liberty is simply not punishment for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause. See, 
e.g., In re Williams' Petition, 145 Mont. 45, 55-58, 399 P.2d 732, 738-39 (1965). 
But cf. Peterson v. Dunbar, 355 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1962) (dictum). This position, 
however, is not convincing. If an individual were convicted and placed on condition-
al liberty for five years, and if the five years elapsed without incident, one could 
hardly argue that conditional liberty could later be revoked and further punishment 
imposed because the defendant had not yet been punished. See Oksanen v. United 
States, 362 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1966). ·Amore convincing rationale is that conditional 
liberty and subsequent incarceration are part of the same punishment. See United 
States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964). 
22. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Note, Twice 
in Jeopardy, 15 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965). 
23. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); In re Nielsen, 131 
U.S.176, 182-91 (1889). 
24. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711. 735 (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Note, supra note 22, at 278. 
25. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1969). This use of successive 
prosecutions, however, may not be possible when revocation proceedings and criminal 
prosecutions are initiated by separate government bodies that do not regularly 
communicate. 
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to obtain a more "appropriate" sentence26 or multiple punishments 
for the same offense. 27 In all cases, the double jeopardy clause 
protects defendants from harassment. 28 Holding both a criminal trial 
and a revocation hearing for the same criminal act arguably violates 
these fundamental policies. Two proceedings allow the state two 
chances to prove its case and two chances to obtain an appropriate 
sentence.29 In addition, multiple punishment may result.3° Finally, 
two proceedings may be used to harass the defendant. 
Despite these arguable infringements on the policies underlying 
the double jeopardy clause, the state's significant interest in conduct-
ing dual proceedings may render permissible such a procedure, at 
least in some cases. Most courts that have considered the issue have, 
in fact, permitted two proceedings, 31 although these courts generally 
have not articulated fully their reasons for rejecting double jeopardy 
arguments. Either of two plausible analyses justifies the conclusion 
that separate proceedings do not contravene the double jeopardy 
clause. First, one might argue, as some courts have, 33 that the 
defendant is not in fact "in jeopardy" during the revocation proceed-
ing. Second, one might argue that, even if a defendant is in jeopardy 
at the revocation hearing, he is in jeopardy for a different offense than 
at the criminal trial. 
26. See authorities cited in note 24 supra. 
27. See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States 
v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). 
28. The double jeopardy clause "prevents the State from using its criminal 
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear the accused out by a multitude of 
cases with accumulated trials .••. " North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 733-34 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
29. See People v. Whitt, 16 Ill. App. 3d 824, 306 N.E.2d 882 (1974) (Strouder, 
J., concurring); MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.3(2)(a) & comment at 50 (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, 1954); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND 
GOALS, TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS, §§ 5.4(5), 12.4(2) (1973) 
[hereinafter CORRECTIONS]. 
30. But cf. In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, -, 296 N.E.2d 280, 288-89 (1973) 
(inmates, once indicted, convicted, and sentenced for the crime of escape could not 
also be subject to punitive segregation on return to prison for violation of prison rule 
against escape). 
31. See Bible v. State, 449 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994 
(1972); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965); MacLaren v. 
Denno, 173 F. Supp. 237, affd., 272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 
814 (1960); People v. Morgan, 55 III. App. 2d 157, 204 N.E.2d 314 (1965); 
Marutzky v. State, 514 P.2d 430 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Banks v. State, 503 
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 
721 (1974). Cf. United States ex rel. Callens v. Buono, 260 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966); United States ex rel. Home v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 234 F. Supp. 368 
(E.D. Pa. 1964). But cf. People v. Whitt, 16 III. App. 3d 824, 306 N.E.2d 882, 885-
86 (1974) (Strouder, J., concurring). 
32. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 55 Ill. App. 2d 157, 160-61, 204 N.E.2d 314, 316 
(1965); Marutzky v. State, 514 P.2d 430, 431-32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Bass v. 
State, 501 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); 
Settles v. State, 403 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). 
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The first analysis requires an examination of the meaning of 
"jeopardy" for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. In Breed v. 
Jones,33 the Supreme Court recently defined "jeopardy" in the follow-
ing terms: 
Jeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes 
the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution. 
. . . Although the constitutional language, "jeopardy of life or limb," 
suggests proceedings in which only the most serious penalties can be 
imposed, the Clause has long been construed to mean something far 
broader than its literal language. . . . At the same ,time, however, 
we have held that the risk to which the Clause refers is not present 
in proceedings that are not "essentially criminal."34 
The Breed Court proceeded to hold that a juvenile commitment 
proceeding involving an alleged violation of the criminal law consti-
tuted "jeopardy" and that a subsequent criminal prosecution for the 
same offense was therefore unconstitutional. The Court refused to 
conclude 
that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object 
is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a crim-
inal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma 
inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for 
many years .... 
. . . Because of its purpose and potential consequences, and the 
nature and resources of the State, such a proceeding imposes heavy 
pressures and burdens-psychological, physical, and financial-on a 
person charged. 35 
Although these conclusions about the nature of juvenile commit-
ment hearings may appear apposite to revocation proceedings, the 
two situations are distinguishable. First, the defendant in a revoca-
tion hearing, unlike a defendant in a juvenile commitment proceed-
ing, has already been stigmatized by a criminal conviction. Thus, the 
additional stigma engendered by revocation may be far less substan-
tial than the stigma caused by an initial juvenile commitment. Sec-
ond, the state's interest in conducting dual proceedings is far greater 
in the conditional liberty context than in the juvenile commitment 
context. In determining whether the defendant in a juvenile commit-
ment hearing is "in jeopardy," the Breed Court analyzed the respec-
tive state and individual interests and found that the state vindicates 
no substantial interest when it conducts both a juvenile commitment 
hearing and a criminal trial;36 thus, proscription of dual proceedings 
"would pose [no] significant problem for the administration of the 
juvenile court system."37 In contrast, the state has several legitimate 
33. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
34. 421 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added). 
35. 421 U.S. at 529-30 (footnotes omitted). 
36. 421 U.S. at 534-35. 
37. 421 U.S. at 538. 
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reasons for holding both a revocation proceeding and a criminal 
trial. 38 Proscription of dual proceedings would impair the effective 
functioning of the conditional liberty system and thus does not seem 
mandated by the double jeopardy clause. 39 
If one views revocation as essentially punishment for the first 
offense committed by the defendant, the one that originally gave rise 
to the conditional liberty, a second analysis will sustain the conclusion 
that the double jeopardy clause does not bar dual proceedings in this 
context. Under this analysis, while the defendant would be in jeop-
ardy at the criminal trial for the second offense, he would be in 
jeopardy at the revocation hearing only for the first offense. Thus, 
no double jeopardy problem would arise. 40 
This analysis is somewhat undercut by recent evidence that sug-
gests that revocation for a second offense serves in fact as punishment 
for that second offense. 41 An empirical sentencing study concludes 
that revocation of conditional liberty and criminal conviction are 
often used as alternatives to punish for criminal acts committed 
during the term of conditional liberty.42 Furthermore, several cases 
indicate that fairly severe penalties, in relation to the original term of 
38. See text at notes 15-20 supra. 
39. A similar analysis has led courts to conclude that a prisoner at a disciplinary 
hearing is not in jeopardy despite the imposition of a punitive sanction. See United 
States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 60, 62-63 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hedges, 458 
F.2d 188, 190 (10th Cir. 1972); People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 684, 213 
N.W.2d 800, 801 (1973); State v. Boyd, 498 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1973); State v. 
Carroll, 17 N.C. App. 691, 195 S.E.2d 306 (1973). In such cases, there might well 
be a legitimate need to conduct separate prison disciplinary proceedings; for instance, 
administration of the prison might require the threat of immediate punishment to 
maintain order in the prison setting. 
40. See note 21 supra. 
41. It is of course clear that revocation is imposed because a criminal act was 
committed during the term of conditional liberty, and, in this sense, revocation clearly 
reflects that act. See Bible v. State, 499 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 994 (1972). The question is whether revocation constitutes punishment for 
that act or for the defendant's initial criminal conduct. 
Illinois courts have suggested that subsequent criminal activity may be the basis 
for revocation of conditional liberty but that the criminal activity during conditional 
liberty may not be considered in determining the sentence. See People v. Bullion, 21 
ill. App. 3d 297, 299-300, 314 N.E.2d 731, 732 (1974); People v. Probert, 3 Ill. App. 
3d 758, 759, 279 N.E.2d 181, 182 (1972); People v. Livingston, 117 Ill. App. 2d 189, 
192, 254 N.E.2d 64, 65 (1969). However, such a rule would not provide much 
protection if, as is apparently the case, the sentencing authority still considers the 
subsequent criminal activity in determining the possibility of the defendant's rehabili-
tation. See People v. Hardy, 8 Ill. App. 3d 854,291 N.E.2d 242 (1972). 
42. See R. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 153. Cf. the report of the oral argument in 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), at 36 U.S.L.W. 3153-54 (U.S. 1967): "Mr. 
Justice Fortas asked if it was true . . . [that one of the petitioners] had never actually 
been tried in connection with the criminal charges that led to revocation of his 
probation, and thus to his imprisonment. This was true, replied [counsel for 
petitioners]. Mr. Justice Fortas then commented that this must make for efficient 
administration of justice. 'Very efficient administration,' replied [counsel]." 
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conditional liberty, can result from revocation for criminal conduct 
during the term of conditional liberty.43 
Despite this evidence, this second analysis seems consistent with 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in North Carolina v. Pearce.44 Pearce 
was convicted and sentenced to prison, but several years later his 
conviction was reversed. On retrial, he was again convicted and 
sentenced, this time to a prison term longer than that received after 
the first conviction. The Court held that this result did not violate 
the double jeopardy clause: "A trial judge is not constitutionally 
precluded . . . from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or 
less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to 
the first trial that may have thrown any new light upon the defend-
ant's 'life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensi-
ties.' "45 A revocation hearing in which the sanction imposed reflects 
criminal activity committed during the term of conditional liberty 
seems analogous to the Pearce situation. 46 In both cases, the defend-
43. In Sluder v.- Brantley, 454 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1972), the defendant bad 
originally pleaded guilty to a $50 burglary charge and was placed on deferred 
sentence. Three months later, charges of kidnapping, statutory rape, and the taking 
of indecent liberties led to a revocation of probation and the imposition of a prison 
term of 20 to 40 years. The court was certain that the sentence imposed ''was 
directly related to the original burglary offense." 454 F.2d at 1269. In Bible v. 
State, 499 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994 (1972), the defendant 
received a one-week jail sentence and five-year probation after a conviction for child 
molestation. When be was later arrested for statutory rape, bis probation was 
revoked and a 20-to-25-year jail sentence was imposed. In People v. Talach, 19 Ill. 
App. 3d 189, 311 N.E.2d 319 (1974), the defendant was placed ·on probation for five 
years for armed robbery. Following bis later conviction for rape, probation was 
revoked, and a sentence of 10 to 20 years was imposed. 
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
45. 395 U.S. at 723, quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). In 
Williams, the judge, when sentencing the defendant to death in spite of the jury's 
recommendation of life imprisonment, bad admittedly considered information about 
the defendant's previous criminal conduct that bad not been presented at trial. In 
affirming the sentence, the Supreme Court emphasized that modern penology required 
that punishment "fit the offender and not merely the crime," 337 U.S. at 247, and 
therefore that it was permissible for the judge to consider information "about the 
convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensi-
ties." 337 U.S. at 245. The Court specifically noted that such a procedure was 
essential to an effective indeterminate sentencing or probation program. See 337 U.S. 
at 248. 
46. Pearce could arguably be distinguished on the ground that the focus of that 
trial, unlike a revocation hearing, was on the commission of the first criminal act 
rather than on the subsequent behavior. However, in a case in which there has been 
significant criminal conduct subsequent to the first offense, subsequent conduct would 
certainly be considered by the trial court in its sentencing decision as much as such 
conduct would be considered in a revocation proceeding. For example, in Williams v. 
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), the defendant first pleaded guilty to murder and 
received life imprisonment. He then stood trial in anqther county for having 
kidnapped the same victim. When the defendant again pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced this time to death, the sentencing judge indicated that the death penalty was 
imposed because the defendant had killed the kidnap victim. The defendant objected 
that he was subject to multiple punishment and thus was denied due process of law. 
(The double jeopardy clause was not yet binding on the states. See note 21 supra.) 
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ant is sentenced for his initial offense, but the sentence is determined 
in the light of events subsequent to the first trial. Thus, Pearce sup-
ports the conclusion that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit 
holding both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial. 
From the above, then, it seems clear that the double jeopardy 
clause does not require the states to abandon altogether the use of 
dual proceedings in the conditional liberty context. On the other 
hand, some of the double jeopardy interests infringed by holding dual 
proceedings might still be protected by the due process clause. Un-
der the approach taken in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,47 there may in fact be 
circumstances in which the due process clause would require the 
states to conduct only one proceeding. 
A careful weighing of state and individual interests reveals that, in 
the situation where the revocation hearing is held first and the defend-
ant is there "acquitted,"48 due process should prevent relitigation of 
the defendant's guilt49 at a subsequent trial. 50 As traditional notions 
of collateral estoppel recognize, the state's interest in relitigating in 
this situation is minimal: If the state cannot meet the lower burden of 
proof at a revocation hearing, it should be precluded from again con-
testing the issue of guilt at a criminal trial. 51 Although it could be 
The Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty arid noted that "the exercise of a 
sound discretion in such a case required consideration of all the circumstances of the 
crime . . . ." 358 U.S. at 585. 
47. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, the Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case 
due process analysis in determining whether there is a right to counsel in revocation 
hearings. See 411 U.S. at 790-91. 
48. Two determinations are made at the revocation hearing. First, a determina• 
tion is made regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence of the alleged violation. This 
determination is here referred to as "conviction" or "acquittal." Second, if the 
defendant is "convicted," a discretionary judgment must be made whether the viola-
tion is sufficiently serious to warrant revocation. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 479-80 (1972). 
49. Applying collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings is not always a simple 
task. When, for example, a jury returns a verdict of not guilty, it is often unclear 
what factual finding underlies the verdict and therefore what facts the state should be 
estopped from proving in a subsequent proceeding. See generally Schaefer, Unre• 
solved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 
391, 394 (1970). However, because identical assertions should be at issue in the revo-
cation hearing and in criminal trial, the application of collateral estoppel in this con-
text should not present this problem. 
· 50. See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d ·100, 103 n.4 (1st Cir. 1974) (dictum), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1975). Cf. Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 
1962) (dictum); 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE ,r 0.418(1), at 2702 n.5 (2d ed. 
1975). But see Marutzky v. State, 514 P.2d 430 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (defendant 
was acquitted at initial revocation hearing and convicted at criminal trial; in subse• 
quent revocation hearing, both double jeopardy and res judicata arguments were 
rejected); Bass v. State, 501 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (same). 
51. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
Collateral estoppel would not apply if the federal government conducted one 
proceeding and a state conducted the other, since the party against whom the estoppel 
is to be raised was not a party or in privity with a party in the first proceeding, See, 
e.g., United States v. Burke, 495 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
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argued that fact-finding in a relatively informal revocation proceeding 
is not reliable enough to foreclose the state from subsequent criminal 
prosecution, the presence of counsel, probably required where the 
defendant's guilt is contested,52 should render the revocation hearing 
sufficiently adversarial53 to provide a reliable basis for estoppel. 54 In 
addition, the required presence of counsel should render unpersuasive 
any state argument that foreclosing dual proceedings would increase 
the cost of preparation for the revocation hearing and thereby unduly 
burden the conditional liberty system: The state must already expend 
the resources necessary for an adversarial proceeding. In contrast, 
allowing the state to relitigate might substantially infringe several 
interests of the defendant, since the state might be able to seek a more 
sympathetic trier-of-fact in the second proceeding or use the first 
proceeding as a practice run. Thus, since the application of collateral 
estoppel will afford substantial protection to the defendant · while 
imposing only minimal burdens on the conditional liberty system, due 
process mandates that a criminal trial not be held when a defendant 
has been acquitted at a revocation hearing. 
In contrast to the above situation, where the first proceeding is 
a revocation hearing resulting in "conviction," or where the first pro-
ceeding is a criminal trial, due process should not prohibit the state 
from conducting a subsequent proceeding. Where the initial pro-
ceeding is a criminal trial resulting in acquittal of the defendant, the 
state has a substantial interest in being able to conduct a subsequent 
revocation hearing to ensure that the grant of conditional liberty can 
be terminated with relative ease. 55 Where the initial proceeding is a 
1079 (1975). This general rule of privity is analogous to the dual sovereign 
exception to the double jeopardy clause, which aIIows two separate sovereigns to 
prosecute for the same conduct. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). This 
doctrine has not avoided criticism. See United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d 354, 360 
nn.13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. 
REV. 607 (1969); Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 297-98, 
nn.401-05 (1975). But when a defendant seeks to raise an estoppel in state court, he 
may be aided by statute. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1970); N.Y. 
CRIM. P. LAW§ 40.20 (McKinney 1971). 
52. See note 9 supra. 
53. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). 
54. The presence of a judge, an experienced fact-finder, rather than an adminis-
trative body, may distinguish probation and deferred sentence revocation from parole 
revocation for collateral estoppel purposes. One might be less willing to rely on an 
administrative finding of fact to foreclose a subsequent criminal trial. Cf. People v. 
Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973) (decision of 
California magistrate dismissing criminal charges following a preliminary examina-
tion found not to have collateral estoppel ramifications, since the magistrate need not 
have been an attorney). 
55. See text at notes 15-18 supra. But cf. People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260, 263-
64, 319 N.E.2d 43, 45-46 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975). 
The difference between the burden of proof in a revocation hearing and that in a 
criminal trial should limit the application of collateral estoppel in this situation. See 
. United States v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Markovich, 
536 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:525 
criminal trial or revocation hearing and the defendant is found 
guilty, 56 the state has a substantial interest in being able to seek the 
most appropriate punishment for the defendant; where the defendant 
has potentially committed more than one crime, such punishment 
may require dual proceedings. Although it is possible that the state 
will abuse dual proceedings (for example, by using the first proceed-
ing as a practice run), no right of the defendant is infringed unless 
the state actually commits such abuse. 57 Thus, because the state's 
interest in a second proceeding in these contexts is substantial, dual 
proceedings should be permitted unless evidence of actual state mis-
conduct can be produced. 58 
When the state holds a revocation hearing initially, therefore, a 
criminal trial in some cases properly may follow. The possibility of 
such a subsequent trial forces the defendant to decide whether to 
present a defense at the revocation hearing. Since, at the criminal 
trial, the state may be able to use evidence that the defendant presents 
at the initial proceeding, 59 the defendant is confronted with the choice 
348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965); Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 
(1974). But see People v. Grayson, 58 ru. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975); Standlee v. Rhay, 18 CRIM. L. REP. 2269 (E.D. Wash. 
Nov. 7, 1975). 
It might be argued that, by bringing the criminal trial first, the state has indicated 
that its interest in an effective conditional liberty system can be satisfied without an 
informal revocation hearing. The state, however, may have decided to delay the 
revocation proceeding in order to accommodate the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. See text at notes 71-122 infra. 
56. If the criminal trial precedes the revocation bearing and defendant is con-
victed at the trial, the defendant will be foreclosed from litigating the issue of guilt 
at the revocation hearing. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) ("Ob-
viously a parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other forums, as 
in the situation presented when the revocation is based on conviction of another 
crime"). 
57. Although the defendant must face two proceedings, no infringement of his 
rights necessarily results from this situation. Harassment requires more than the 
inconvenience and expense of repeated prosecution; it connotes some actual miscon-
duct by the state. See Downum v. United States, 372-U.S. 734 (1963). 
58. Several factors may be relevant to the finding of such abuse: For example, 
was the decision to bring the second proceeding made before or after the conclusion 
of first proceeding? What is the normal practice followed by the state in such 
circumstances? Such criteria should not be rigidly applied. The state might always 
make its decision to initiate the second proceeding after the first one has commenced. 
The fact that the state usually brings only one proceeding does not imply that it 
would have done so in the instant case. The state might ordinarily bring just one 
proceedin:g because the terms of incarceration that the state may obtain in the 
revocation hearing and the criminal trial are comparable; the instant case may be an 
exception. 
59. Testimony given voluntarily by a defendant in one proceeding is admissible 
against the defendant in a subsequent proceeding. See Harrison v. United States, 392 
U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Edmond v. United States, 273 F.2d 108, 112-13 (D.C. Cir. 
1959). See also United States v. Merrill, 484 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1077 (1973) (voluntary statement made at removal hearing was admissible at 
subsequent criminal trial); Ayres v. United States, 193 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1952) 
(testimony given voluntarily by defendant at civil trial was admissible at subsequent 
criminal trial). 
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of either producing evidence at the revocation hearing and thus 
providing the state with incriminating evidence, or not producing 
evidence and thus forgoing a valuable defense. For example, sup-
pose the state's only evidence that the defendant was at the scene of 
the crime is hearsay, and therefore admissible at the revocation 
hearing but inadmissible at trial. In this situation, the defendant will 
undoubtedly be forced either to forgo a defense at the revocation 
hearing (such as, "He hit me first") or provide one that can later be 
used by the state to establish a critical element of its case. Forcing 
him to so choose suggests a possible infringement of the defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination. so· 
60. Some authority suggests that the fifth amendment is simply a check against 
abusive and inhumane treatment. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 
(1897). This rationale is not particularly convincing. First, prevention of such 
treatment can be achieved through the due process clause. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1960); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 
1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 193 (1968). Second, the privilege against self-incrimination 
protects persons even when there is no hint of physical coercion. See Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,496 (1967). 
Others have suggested that the privilege protects the innocent while aiding in the 
ascertainment of truth. See E. GRISWOLD, THE FIF1H AMENDMENT TODAY 9 (1955). 
However, the Supreme Court rejected this justification in Tehan v. United States ex 
rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966): "[I']he Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth. That privilege .•. 
stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values-values reflecting the 
concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone." This 
establishment of a "right to be let alone" or, alternatively, a preference for an 
accusatorial system of criminal justice, seems persuasive. See Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); McKay, supra, at 
206-14. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
concurring and dissenting); Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); 
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956). If this is in fact the basic 
rationale, a distinction between administrative revocation (parole) and judicial revo-
cation (probation) may be drawn because information divulged at a judicial proceed-
ing might be more accessible to a prosecutor than that divulged at an administrative 
proceeding. 
The fifth amendment is apparently not violated when a litigant in a civil trial 
must decide whether to testify and therefore must choose between giving incriminat-
ing information and forgoing a valuable defense. In fact, most courts hold that an 
unfavorable inference may be drawn against the litigant in a civil trial for invoking 
the privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United Elec. Radio & Mach. 
Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1954), affd. in part and 
vacated in part, 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); Molloy 
v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970). See generally Kaminsky, 
Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Private Civil 
Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 212 (1972). Some courts, 
however, have been sympathetic to the civil litigant and have stayed civil proceedings 
until disposition of the related criminal prosecution. Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Cf. 
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). A burden on the exercise of the 
privilege tolerable in a civil trial, however, is not necessarily permissible at a 
revocation hearing. First, at a civil trial, property interests are at stake, while at the 
revocation hearing, liberty interests are threatened. The privilege against self-
incrimination may well be more solicitous of the latter than the former. See note 101 
infra and accompanying text. Second, a civil trial accords a defendant more 
procedural protection against arbitrariness than a revocation hearing, and consequent-
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Several courts that have considered this issue have permitted the 
state to hold. the revocation hearing first, 61 although some have 
inquired only whether such a procedure constituted an abuse of 
discretion.62 On the other hand, Judge Coffin, in a dissenting opin-
ion, has argued that permitting the state to conduct a revocation 
hearing prior to a criminal trial contravenes the fifth amendment's 
fundamental preference for an accusatorial, not an inquisitional, sys-
tem of criminal justice: 
[T]he government should not be in a position where it might ,be 
tempted by potentially coercive means to short-cut its broad investiga-
tory responsibilities. . . . 
In [this situation], the government's ability to time the violation 
hearing, with its lower burden of proof, so that it comes before the 
criminal trial on the same charge, enables the government to gain evi-
dence for the criminal trial the easy way. 63 
Furthermore, the California supreme court, in its supervisory capacity 
over California courts, recently proscribed the use of a defendant's 
revocation hearing testimony at a subsequent criminal trial because of 
the possible self-incrimination problem.64 Similarly, the American 
Bar Association has recently recommended that, in order to avoid a 
self-incrimination problem, the revocation hearing should not precede 
the criminal trial. 65 Finally, the American Law Institute00 and the 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals67 have proffered the same recommendation, although they have 
ly, forgoing personal testimony at a revocation hearing may be more costly than at a 
civil trial. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 889, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 401, 533 
P.2d 1024, 1039 (1975). Third, to the extent that a civil suit is instituted by a 
private individual and therefore the state is not able to manipulate the timing of the 
two proceedings, the state can not abuse its coercive power to obtain evidence. 
61. See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974), revg. 372 F. Supp. 213 
(D.R.!. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 
102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); People v. Carr, - Colo.-, 524 P.2d 301 (1974). Cf. 
Baker v. Levine, 34 Misc. 2d 16,225 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 1962). 
62. See United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); Gross v. Bishop, 377 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 
1967); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965); Jianole v. United 
States, 58 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1932); United States v. Feller, 156 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. 
Alas. 1957); English v. State, 1 Ala. Div. 527,303 S.2d 156 (1974); Beasley v. State, 
310 S.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1975). 
63. Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 105-06 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1026 (1975). 
64. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 
(1975). See also United States v. Peters, 18 CRIM. L. REP. 2342 (D.C. Sup. Ct., 
Dec. 12, 1975). 
65. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION§ 5.3, at 62-65 (Tent. Draft 1970). 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.3(2)(a) & comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
1954). 
67. CoRRECTIONs, supra note 29, §§ 5.4(5), 12.4(2). In addition, several state 
statutes arguably could be interpreted as forbidding a revocation hearing held before 
trial. See note 13 supra. 
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not specifically focused on the self-incrimination problem. The area, 
then, is somewhat unsettled and requires close scrutiny. 
Judicial analyses of the self-incrimination problem have generally 
been deficient in two respects. First, although analysis of the self-
incrimination problem requires the consideration of both a defend-
ant's decision whether to testify personally and his decision whether to 
introduce other evidence, such as witnesses and documents, the courts 
that have considered the problem have focused only on his decision 
whether to testify. Second, these courts have not adequately consid-
ered the existence of alternative procedures that could minimize the 
infringement of defendants' fifth amendment interests without unduly 
burdening the state. This Note will first consider whether, on the 
sole basis of the defendant's decision whether to testify at the revoca-
tion hearing, an infringement of the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination results. After concluding that, even on this limited 
basis, a strong argument can be made that such an infringement does 
result, consideration will be given to the self-incrimination aspects of 
the defendant's decision whether to introduce other .evidence. On the 
basis of this added consideration and the fact that less intrusive 
procedures could be utilized to eliminate the infringement of defend-
ant's rights, the Note concludes that the fifth amendment mandates 
the implementation of such alternative procedures. 
The privilege against self-incrimination protects a defendant 
against the compelled disclosure of testimony that is personal, 68 testi-
monial, 69 and potentially incriminating. 70 The defendant's testimony 
at an initial revocation proceeding is undoubtedly both personal and 
testimonial; in addition, it is likely to be incriminating at a subsequent 
criminal trial. 71 The determinative question is therefore whether a 
68. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Couch v. United States, 
409 U.S. 322 (1972); notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text. 
69. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1965); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 
2263 (11cNaughton rev. 1960); notes 107-14 infra and accompanying text. 
70. To be incriminating, the disclosure must merely be a " 'link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.'" Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 
479, 486 (1951). The privilege is particularly solicitous of defendants. It indulges a 
presumption that anything to which a defendant might testify is incriminating. 8 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§§ 2260, 2268 (McNaughton rev. 1960). 
The possibility of compelling testimony for use solely at the revocation proceeding 
is a separate question. Compare Holmes v. State, 311 S.2d 780 (Fla. App. 1975), 
with Heath v. State, 310 S.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1975). 
71. It might be argued that the defendant would preseJ:lt substantially the same 
evidence at the revocation hearing as at the criminal trial, and therefore that 
testimony presented at the hearing would not be incriminating at the criminal trial. 
This argument is faulty for two reasons. First, because of the less stringent rules of 
evidence and lower burden of proof at the revocation hearing, defendant might well 
give testimony at the hearing that he would not give at trial. Second, even though the 
defendant presents the same testimony at trial as at the hearing, the testimony at trial 
may still be incriminating. This is because at trial the state will have the defendant's 
hearing testimony available for use in the state's case and can use such testimony to 
oppose the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the state's case. 
' 
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defendant at a revocation hearing is subject to compulsion. Compul-
sion has been found in two situations involving dual proceedings: (1) 
where a defendant testifies under impermissible pressure at the initial 
proceeding, and (2) where a defendant, asserting his privilege 
against self-incrimination in anticipation of a later proceeding, refuses 
to testify at the first proceeding and suffers an impermissible penalty 
as a result. In both situations, resolution of the issue of compulsion 
requires a determination whether the penalty, either threatened or 
imposed, constitutes a permissible burden upon the exercise of fifth 
amendment rights. 
The first of these situations is illustrated by two Supreme Court 
cases, Garrity v. New Jersey72 and Simmons v. United States.18 In 
Garrity, police officers were investigated for fixing traffic tickets. At 
an investigative hearing, the policemen were told that anything they 
said would be held against them and that they had the right to remain 
silent, but that, if they did remain silent, they would be subject to 
dismissal. The policemen testified and their testimony was used 
against them in a subsequent criminal trial that resulted in conviction. 
Reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court said: 
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to in-
criminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood 
or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free 
choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interroga-
tion practices we reviewed in Miranda . . . is "likely to exert such 
pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free 
and rational choice." We think the statements were infected by the 
coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning . . . . 74 
The Court implied that testimony given under such circumstances 
would not always be compelled and hence inadmissible at a later 
criminal trial. In some cases, the defendant at the initial hearing 
might want "to make a clean breast of the whole affair."7i; But, the 
Court emphasized, forcing the defendant to choose between the lesser 
of two evils does not make his testimony voluntary: " 'Were it other-
wise, as conduct under duress involves a choice, it always would be 
possible for a State to impose an unconstitutional burden by the threat 
Such testimony would not have been available for such use if defendant had merely 
testified at trial, after the state had rested. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and Pros-
ecution: The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C. L. REV. 437, 508 
(1972). 
72, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
73, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
74. 385 U.S. 497-98 (footnote omitted). There was no mention that any other 
pressure was brought to bear on the defendants; in fact, their treatment at the hearing 
seems to have been almost cordial. See 385 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
75. 385 U.S. at 499. This is apparently a question of fact, but the Court did not 
elaborate upon which party bears the burden of proof. 
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of penalties worse than it in case of a failure to accept it, and then to 
declare the acceptance voluntary . . . .' "76 
In Simmons, the defendant asserted both illegal search-and-sei-
zure and self-incrimination claims. The police, in a questionable 
search, had obtained suitcases containing money from a robbery. In 
order to establish standing to object to the admissibility of the evi-
dence, 77 the defendant had testified at a preliminary hearing that the 
suitcases appeared similar to his own. He was later convicted at a 
trial in which this testimony was admitted. The Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction on two grounds. First, the Court found the 
admission of the testimony violative of the fourth amendment because 
it deterred a defendant "from presenting the testimonial proof of 
standing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim."78 Second, 
using a self-incrimination analysis, the Court held that the defendant's 
testimony at the suppression hearing had been compelled: 
A defendant is "compelled" to testify in support of a motion to sup-
press only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he will have 
to forgo a benefit, and testimony is not always involuntary as a mat-
ter of law simply because it is given to obtain a benefit. However, 
the assumption which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant 
has a choice: he may refuse to testify and give up the benefit. When 
this assumption is applied to a situation in which the "benefit" to be 
gained is that afforded by another provision of the -Bill of Rights, an 
undeniable tension is created. Thus, in this case [the defendant] 
was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of coun-
sel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim, or in legal effect, to 
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against seif-incrimination. In 
these circumstances we find it intolerable that one constitutional right 
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. 79 
The second situation in which the Supreme· Court has considered 
the issue of compulsion is represented by Spevack v. Klein,80 the 
companion case to Garrity. The defendant, a lawyer, had invoked the 
fifth amendment and refused to answer questions at a disbarment 
proceeding. For his silence, the lawyer was disbarred. The Court, 
reversing the disciplinary action, stated that " 'the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees ... the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses 
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, an~ to suffer no 
76. 385 U.S. at 498, citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Commn., 248 U.S. 67, 
70 (1918). 
77. The defendant's statement was crucial to the assertion of fourth amendment 
rights because these rights are personal rights and may be enforced by the exclusion 
of evidence only at the instance of those whose privacy was invaded by the search. 
See generally Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
78. 390 U.S. at 393-94. 
79. 390 U.S. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted). McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183 (1971), limits this second rationale in Simmons. See note 91 infra; text at notes 
89-97 infra. 
80. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). 
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penalty . . . for such silence.' "81 It is emphasized that the notion of 
penalty is a broad one: "In this context 'penalty' is not restricted to 
fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the imposition of any sanction 
which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly.' "82 
The Court followed this reasoning in three other cases-Gardner 
v. Broderick,83 Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commis-
sioner of Sanitation,84 and Lefkowitz v. Turley85-all of which in-
volved hearings investigating alleged criminal conduct and presented 
the possibility that criminal proceedings would follow. In all three 
81. 385 U.S. at 514, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 ( 1964). 
82. 385 U.S. at 515. 
In his dissent in Spevack, Justice White argued that there can be no violation of 
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination if he remains silent at an initial 
proceeding since the defendant need only testify to avoid the consequences of 
remaining silent. See 385 U.S. at 531. If the state attempts to introduce the 
testimony at a subsequent criminal trial, the defendant can then claim that such 
evidence was compelled and is therefore inadmissible. This argument, however, fails 
to consider that the privilege of a defendant who has made such a choice may not be 
fully safeguarded. A later court may always hold that the testimony was voluntary 
and that the privilege against self-incrimination was thereby waived. See text at note 
15supra. 
The Court had occasion to address this issue in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 
(1975). There, during the trial of a civil case, an attorney had counseled his client 
to refuse, on fifth amendment grounds, to produce material demanded by subpoena 
duces tecum. The lawyer believed in good faith that the material would have tended 
to incriminate his client at a subsequent criminal trial. The trial court reasoned that 
the defendant could have asserted any self-incrimination claim in a motion to 
suppress the evidence at a subsequent criminal trial and therefore held the attorney in 
contempt. See 419 U.S. at 445. The Supreme Court rejected the trial court's 
argument and reversed, holding that in the absence of a grant of immunity for the 
materials produced the defendant " 'would be compelled to surrender the very 
protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.'" 419 U.S. at 462, quoting 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). In his concurring opinion, 
Justice White clearly stated that only if the defendant is assured of immunity can he 
be penalized for a refusal to testify: "Had the client been granted immunity or had he 
been advised of its functional equivalent . . . it may well have been that his choice, 
and the advice of [counsel], would have been quite different." 419 U.S. at 475. 
83. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). In Gardner, a patrolman claimed that he had been 
unlawfully discharged from the force. After being advised of his right to remain 
silent, he refused to sign a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination before a 
grand jury investigating police department corruption .. After this refusal, an adminis-
trative hearing was held and he was discharged solely because he had refused to waive 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
84. 392 U.S. 280 (1968). In Sanitation Men, fifteen sanitation employees were 
summoned before the-€ommission of Investigation and were told that, if they refused 
on self-incrimination grounds to testify about their official conduct, they would be 
fired, and that, if they testified, their answers could be used against them_ in 
subsequent proceedings. Twelve refused to testify and were immediately dismissed, 
The other three testified and were subsequently brought before a grand jury where 
each refused to sign a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. These three 
were then discharged. 
85. 414 U.S. 70 (1973 ). In Lefkowitz, a contractor who had entered into public 
contracts refused to waive his privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury 
investigating various charges of conspiracy; he was consequently disqualified from 
further transactions with the state for five years. 
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cases, witnesses asserted their fifth amendment rights and refused to 
testify. As a consequence, they were subjected to substantial eco-
nomic sanctions. The Court held that it was impermissible to impose 
such consequences for exercising the right to remain silent. As it 
stated in Lefkowitz: "[I]he State must recognize what our cases 
hold: that answers elicited upon the threat of the loss of employment 
are compelled and inadmissible in evidence. Hence, if answers are to 
be required in such circumstances states must offer to the witness 
whatever immunity is required to supplant the privileges and may not 
insist that the employee or contractor waive such immunity."86 
In all of the cases discussed above, the Court found that the 
element of compulsion necessary to find a violation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination could be inferred from the imposition (or 
threat of imposition) of a penalty for exercising the privilege. The 
essential question is thus whether forcing the defendant at a revoca-
tion hearing to choose between testifying and incriminating himself 
later at trial, and remaining silent and surrendering a valuable de-
fense, constitutes a penalty for the exercise of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. No one formulation of "penalty'' appears to have 
received the sanction of the Court. Simmons indicates that the 
surrender of a right secured by ,the Bill of Rights is a penalty.87 
Spevack proffers a far broader definition-anything that makes the 
assertion of the privilege more "costly."88 One thing is certain 
however: Not every burden on the exercise of the privilege against 
self-incrimination will be deemed a penalty. 
In McGautha v. California, 89 the petitioner was convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to death by a jury that had resolved the 
86. 414 U.S. at 85. There is rather cryptic dictum in Gardner: "If appellant, a 
policeman, bad refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly 
relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive his 
immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal 
prosecution of himself, Garrity v. New Jersey, ... the privilege against self-
incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal." 392 U.S. at 278. This 
statement should not be read as an exception to the penalty analysis. It states 
that, given immunity, a public official may be discharged for failing to answer 
questions directly relating to his fitness to remain a public official. It does 
not say that the defendants could have been forced to choose between testifying 
without immunity and losing a job. As the Court in Lefkowitz said in referring to 
Gardner: ''This Court has only recently held that employees of the State do not 
forfeit their constitutional privilege and that they may be compelled to respond to 
questions about the performance of their duties but only if their answers cannot be 
used against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions." 414 U.S. at 79. But see 
Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 307, 494 P.2d 485 
(1972). 
87. See text at note 79 supra. 
88. 385 U.S. at 515. Cf. London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d 95 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1972); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1289 (1st Cir. 
1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), modified, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.), cert. 
granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975). 
89. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
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issues of guilt and punishment in a single trial, the so-called unitary 
trial. The defendant asserted that he had a due process right to 
address his sentencer (allocution) but that the unitary trial had forced 
him to forgo this right in order to assert his privilege against self-
incrimination. He argued that this c;reated a tension between consti-
tutional rights similar to that proscribed by the Court in Simmons. 
Assuming without deciding that a due process right of allocution 
existed, 90 the Court rejected this contention and thereby threw into 
considerable doubt the self-incrimination analysis, though not the 
holding, of Simmons: "While we have no occasion to question the 
soundness of the result in Simmons and do not do so, to the extent 
that its rationale was based on a 'tension' between constitutional 
rights and the policies behind them, the validity of that reasoning 
must now be regarded as open to question . . . ."91 
In determining whether the-defendant had suffered a penalty, the 
McGautha Court examined some analogous "difficult choices" that a 
defendant must confront in the course of any criminal trial. It noted 
that after the state has presented its case a criminal defendant must 
always decide, for example, whether to assert a defense and whether 
to take the stand.92 If he furnishes incriminating information in 
these situations, b,e does so primarily because of the force of the 
state's evidence. The Court emph~ized that response to this kind of 
pressure ltas never been considered a violation of the fifth amendment 
and "that the mere force of evidence is [not] compulsion of the sort 
forbidden by the privilege."93 It thus concluded that, since the force 
of the state's evidence "pressured" the defendant in McGautha to 
90. 402 U.S. at218-19. 
91. 402 U.S. at 212-13. The Court emphasized that the holding in Simmons 
really rested on the fourth amendment. "The insubstantiality of . . • purely Fifth 
Amendment interests involved in Simmons was illustrated last term by the trilogy of 
cases involving guilty pleas • . . ." 402 U.S. at 212. These guilty plea cases are 
discussed at notes 124-29 infra and accompanying text. 
It should be noted that on previous occasions the Court had not drawn such a 
sharp distinction between fourth and fifth amendment claims. For instance, in Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court said the fourth and fifth amend-
ments ran "almost into each other'' and that the two amendments were different 
aspects of the same goal, protection of the individual's privacy. 116 U.S. at 630. In 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court, in first holding that the privilege 
against self-incrimination was applicable to the states, relied on the close relationship 
between self-incrimination and the fourth amendment and the fact that the fourth 
amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure had already been made 
binding on the states. 
92. 402 U.S. at 215. 
93. 402 U.S. at 213. The Court divided its analysis into two parts: If the 
defendant, at the risk of damaging his case on the issue of guilt, yielded to the 
pressure to be heard on the issue of sentencing, the privilege was not abridged. 402 
U.S. at 213-17. If the defendant remained silent on the issue of sentencing, 
defendant suffered no penalty. 402 U.S. at 217-20. The Court's analysis of the two 
problems really did not differ. In each case, the Court considered how serious a 
consequence it was that a defendant, remaining silent, would not be heard on the issue 
of his sentencing. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970). 
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address his sentencer, the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion had not been transgressed. 
Despite this language, McGauthds precedential value seems to 
have been limited by the Supreme Court's decision, one year later, in 
Brooks v. Tennessee.94 Brooks involved a fifth amendment chal-
lenge to a Tennessee statute that required a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding to testify before any other evidence on his behalf was 
presented or forfeit his right to testify. The defendant did not testify 
and was convicted. Upholding the defendant's challenge, the Court 
noted that, at -the close of the state's case, the defendant might not yet 
have decided whether to testify because of his uncertainty as to how 
his own case would develop. 95 As a result, 
[r]ather than risk the dangers of taking ·the stand, ,[he] might prefer 
to remain silent at that point, putting off his testimony until its value 
can be realistically assessed. Yet, under the Tennessee rule, he can-
not make that choice "in the unfettered exercise of his own will." 
• • • This, we think, casts a ,[heavy :burden on a defendant's other-
wise] unconditional right not to take the stand. The rule, in other 
words, "cuts down on the privilege [to remain silent] by making 
its assertion costly."96 
The Brooks Court seemed to indicate that the consequence of not 
testifying first-not being able to testify later-constituted a penalty. 
Yet, the choice that the defendant in Brooks confronted was similar 
to that faced by the defendant in McGautha: In either case, a decision 
to testify would have been based on the for~e of the state's _evidence. 
The authority of McGautha thus seems to have been vitiated. As 
Justice Burger, dissenting in Brooks, stated: 
Indeed, the "choice" we sustained in McGautha was far more difficult 
than that here, as the procedure there clearly exerted considerable 
force to compel defendant to waive the privilege and take the stand 
in order to avoid the possible imposition of the death penalty.97 
Although Brooks thus supports the proposition that an infringe-
ment of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is possible 
even though he testifies in response to the force of the state's evi-
dence, several courts, relying on M cGautha, have nevertheless found 
that no penalty inheres in holding a revocation hearing before the 
criminal trial.98 The First Circuit, in Flint v. Mullen,99 found such 
94. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
95. 406 U.S. at 609. 
96. 406 U.S. at 610-11, quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
97. 406 U.S. at 615. 
98. See cases cited in note 61 supra. See also Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala. App. 587, 
121 S.2d 878 (1960) (inference of guilt from defendant's silence at revocation 
hearing allowed). But cf. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. 
granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975), in which petitioner was taken before a prison 
disciplinary board for inciting a prison disturbance and told, first, that he might later 
be prosecuted for violation of state law and, second, that at the prison disciplinary 
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reliance on McGautha reconcilable with the Spevack line of economic 
coercion cases: While the economic coercion cases proscribe the 
imposition of certain direct penalties for remaining silent at a revoca-
tion hearing, they do not indicate that the mere surrender of a 
valuable defense, with the consequent risk of an adverse judgment, 
constitutes an impermissible penalty.100 Significantly, despite its rel-
evance, neither the First Circuit nor the other courts considering the 
issue referred to Brooks. 
Notwithstanding the arguments in Flint, the defendant at a revo-
cation hearing who asserts his privilege against self-incrimination 
suffers some highly undesirable consequences. His waiver of a valua-
ble defense at the initial revocation hearing imposes a significant 
"cost" upon his assertion of the privilege-the potential deprivation 
of his liberty. This cost, it is true, is distinguishable from the cost 
imposed in the economic coercion cases. Yet, when a defendant is 
faced with a loss of liberty rather than a loss of property, courts 
should be even more sensitive to the possibility of infringement upon 
fifth amendment rights.101 Moreover, even if McGautha's authority 
was not undercut by Brooks, the defendant's choice in McGautha 
should be distinguished from the defendant's decision whether to tes-
tify at a revocation hearing. Because the state may sustain a lower 
burden of proof, and because the less stringent rules of evidence and 
the less extensive right to cross-examine provide the defendant at a 
revocation hearing with fewer procedural protections, a defendant 
sacrifices far more by remaining silent there than he does at a crim-
hearing an inference of guilt would be drawn from his silence. The Court found this 
procedure impermissible. 
99. 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1975). 
100. See De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1180 (3d Cir. 1970). The defendant in 
a pending criminal prosecution sought to enjoin a state disbarment inquiry concerning 
the same alleged misconduct. The court found no penalty on the assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, since no inference of guilt or wrong-doing could 
be drawn from the attorney's silence. See also Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 
(9th Cir. 1974), modified on rehearing, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 421 
U.S. 1010 (1975), involving a prison disciplinary hearing held before a criminal trial, 
both proceedings growing out of the same alleged conduct. The defendant's difficult 
choice whether to testify at the disciplinary hearing "does not make the testimony 
coerced nor does it require the grant of immunity." 497 F.2d at 823 n.23. As long 
as silence was not used against the person, ruled the court, there was no coercion to 
speak. But cf. Cotter v. State Civil Serv. Commn., 6 Pa. Commnw. 498, 297 A.2d 
176 (1972). 
101. See Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("mhe 
loss of liberty presents an even stronger compulsion than loss of employment, and 
thus the need for immunity may be correspondingly greater"). Cf. Uniformed 
Sanitation Men Assn. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) (drawing a distinction between property and liberty 
in fifth amendment matters). See also United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 
F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974); Kaminsky, supra note 60, at 
134-35. But cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47-52 (1972) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that no distinction should be made between property and 
liberty). 
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inal trial.102 Therefore, the reliance of these courts on McGautha may 
be misplaced. 
In sum, when the issue is framed solely in terms of the defend-
ant's decision whether to testify, the question whether his privilege 
against self-incrimination is abridged because the revocation hearing 
is held prior to the criminal trial is not easily resolved.103 However, 
the decision whether to testify is only one component of the dilemma 
that confronts a defendant at a revocation hearing: He must also 
decide whether to introduce other evidence, such as witnesses and 
documents. The privilege against self-incrimination also protects the 
defendant from the compelled disclosure of such evidence if it is 
personal, testimonial, and potentially incriminating.104 
As with defendant's testimony, there is little question that evi-
dence presented at a revocation hearing is potentially incriminat-
102. See Flint v. Mullen, 372 F. Supp. 213 (D.R.!. 1973), revd., 499 F.2d 100 
(1st Cir. 1974 ), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1975). See also Melson v. Sard, 402 
F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968): 
If a parolee is not given the full and free ability to testify in his own behalf 
and present his case against revocation, his right to a hearing before the Board 
would be meaningless. Furthermore, his Fifth Amendment rights must not be 
conditioned "by the exaction of a price." Accordingly, we hold that any self-
incriminatory statements made in a parole revocation hearing shall not be used 
affirmatively against the parolee in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 
Cf. Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Fratello, 44 
F.R.D. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Amaro, 79 Misc. 2d 499, 358 N.Y.S.2d 900 
(N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1974). 
Several courts have found that the privilege against self-incrimination is abridged 
when the defendant's testimony at a prison disciplinary hearing is admissible at a 
subsequent criminal trial. See Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973), vacated on other 
grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 922 (1974); Carter v. 
McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 
A.2d 629 (1975). These cases follow the rationale of the district court in Flint and 
distinguish McGautha on the ground that silence is more costly at a prison discipli-
nary hearing because the defendant at such a hearing does not have the procedural 
protections that he would have at trial. Perhaps prison disciplinary cases are 
distinguishable from revocation hearings because prisoners at disciplinary hearings do 
not enjoy even the due process rights guaranteed at revocation hearings by Morrissey. 
See note 7 supra. In Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973), for 
example, the prisoner was given the opportunity to appear before the disciplinary 
committee but was not present to hear any other testimony. 357 F. Supp. at 1075. 
Silence was therefore clearly more costly at the prison discjplinary hearing-than it 
would have been at a revocation hearing. The court noted, however, that, even if due 
process rights similar to those granted in Morrissey were extended to prisoners in 
disciplinary hearings, see 357 F. Supp. at 1084-87, a prisoner faced with the decision 
whether to testify at the hearing would still face a constitutionally impermissible 
dilemma, see 351 F. Supp. at 1092-93. 
103. There is no clear line between permissible and impermissible consequences 
(e.g., those in the economic coercion cases) of invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination. The existence of such a spectrum might dictate some reluctance to 
find constitutional error. Instead, the Constitution might be interpreted to mandate 
only fundamental rudiments of fairness, further refinements and modifications being 
left to each jurisdiction out of respect for a federal system. See McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 181, 221 (1971); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 887 n.18, 
533 P.2d, 1024, 1040 n.18, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384,400 n.18 (1975). 
104. See authorities cited in notes 68-70 supra. 
548 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 14:525 
ing.105 For example, the defendant might call witnesses who will 
provide the state with valuable information about the alleged viola-
tion. Similarly, he might introduce documents that would provide 
important leads to the state. Even alibi witnesses and evidence could 
tend to incriminate the defendant if they divulge to the state valuable 
information about the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the 
crime.106 
It also seems clear that the introduction of such evidence involves 
a testimonial disclosure. "Testimonial" is a term of art used to 
distinguish "communicative" evidence, which is protected by the 
privilege, from physical evidence.107 Thus, compelling a person to 
give a blood108 or writi.ng109 sample or to stand in a line-up110 does 
not transgress the fifth amendment, since these situations involve no 
communication. On the other hand, testimonial evidence includes 
more than an individual's own testimony.111 The privilege is prop-
erly invoked to prevent disclosure of his private documents, papers, 
and chattels, 112 since the disclosure of such items involves an implicit 
communication of the product of the individual's mental processes.113 
105. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974); Prudhomme v. Superior Ct., 2 
Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). This is true even though 
defendant presents the same evidence at trial as at the revocation hearing. See note 
11 supra. In addition to the reasons there discussed, one other reason exists when the 
whole of the defendant's case is considered: The state might well see how weak the 
defendant's entire case is and therefore proceed with a prosecution it would not have 
otherwise pursued. See Jones v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 66, 372 P.2d 919, 925, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting); Nakell, supra note 71, at 508. 
106. See Prudhomme v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 320, 446 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 
129 (1970); Nakell, supra note 71, at 500-01. Note that the Court in Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), did not hold that notice-of-alibi statutes were not 
incriminating; it instead found that there was no compulsion. See 399 U.S. at 84. 
101. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 
2263 (McNaughton rev.1960). 
108. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
109. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
110. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
111. In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court, considering 
a hit-and-run statute that required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to 
stop and give his name and address, seemed to move toward a more restrictive 
definition of "testimonial." A four-member plurality indicated without explanation 
that any disclosures made by a driver in compliance with the statute would not be 
testimonial, 402 U.S. at 431-34, although under the traditional test such a disclosure 
would seem to be testimonial since the driver was implicitly communicating that he 
believed that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, see Note, 
Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1002 n.34 
(1972). Five members of the Court accepted the traditional test and found that the 
statute required a testimonial disclosure. 
112. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 
(McNaughton rev. 1960). 
113. A traditional rationale for this application of the privilege is that such 
situations involve an implicit testimonial communication that the documents produced 
are the documents requested. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (McNaughton rev. 
1960); Note, supra note 111, at 1002. 
January 1976] Revocation of Conditional Liberty 549 
On this basis, the defendant's presentation of evidence at the revoca-
tion hearing would, notwithstanding the nature of such evidence, 
appear to be testimonial. By introducing particular evidentiary 
items, the defendant implicitly communicates that he believes such 
evidence is relevant to the matter being adjudicated.114 
The issue whether the communication implicit in the defendant's 
presentation of evidence is personal to the defendant is somewhat 
more troublesome.1115 The requirement that a communication, in 
order to be protected by the privilege, be personal to the defendant 
reflects the fact that it is the defendantjs "private inner sanctum of 
individual feeling and thought"116 that the privilege protects. When 
a defendant conducts his own defense at the revocation hearing, the 
implicit communication would almost certainly be deemed personal to 
him. However, when a defendant is represented by counsel, the 
communication implicit in the presentation of evidence arguably 
could be considered counsel's. 
Nevertheless, because of the unique relationship between attorney 
and client, counsel's communications should, for fifth amendment 
purposes, be imputed to the defendant.117 Such imputation is neces-
114. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974); Note, supra note 111, at 1001-
04. But see State ex rel. Sikora v. District Ct., 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897 (1969) 
( disclosure by defendant of names of witnesses he expects to call at trial is not 
testimonial); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830 
(1969) (disclosure by defendant of prior statements of defendant's witnesses is not 
testimonial). 
115. The question, it should be emphasized, is whether the defendant's presenta-
tion of evidence is personal to .the defendant, not whether the underlying evidence 
itself is personal. Evidence, even if collected on behalf of a defendant in anticipation 
of a criminal trial, is not necessarily personal. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225 (1975). 
116. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1972) (privilege does not protect 
tax records in the hands of an accountant). The requirement that a disclosure be 
personal in order to be protected by the privilege is consistent with the fundamental 
policy behind the privilege-a preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
tional system of criminal justice. See note 60 supra. The state may shoulder the 
entire investigative burden in a criminal prosecution and still find it necessary to 
demand information that a third party has collected on behalf of a defendant or that 
the defendant has communicated to a third party. Whether the state can require such 
information turns not on the fifth amendment, but on the existence of a common-law 
or statutory privilege. As long as the state discovers on its own that such persons 
have relevant information, see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1972-), or 
the defendant voluntarily discloses that such persons have relevant information, see 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the state has not transgressed the 
defendant's self-incrimination privilege. 
117. See United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 
420 U.S. 906 (1975) (attorney can assert the privilege on behalf of taxpayer 
because attorney would have to have some tax records in his possession to conduct an 
adequate defense of taxpayer). See also United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th 
Cir. 1963); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2307 (McNaughton rev. 1960); Moore, Crimi-
nal Discovery, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 905-10 (1968). But see State v. Olwell, 64 
Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). 
It should be noted that, even if the Supreme Court reverses the decision in 
Kasmir, that case would still be distinguishable from the subject matter of this Note. 
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sary to protect two fundamental constitutional policies. First, by 
preventing the state from acquiring evidence "the easy way," it en-
sures that the state will not "short-cut its broad investigatory responsi-
bilities."118 Second, it protects the defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 119 A defendant would in effect be penalized if 
the "personal" nature of the communication implicit in the presenta-
tion of evidence, and hence the protection of the privilege against self• 
incrimination, hinged on his decision to retain counsel. 
Since defendant's presentation of evidence other than his own 
testimony is thus incriminating, testimonial, and personal, and since 
his testimony clearly fulfills these conditions, 120 it is necessary to 
determine whether the defendant at a revocation hearing is compelled 
to present either or both types of evidence. In order to construct a 
defense at the revocation hearing, a defendant is confronted with a 
difficult choice: If he decides not to introduce his testimony because it 
is incriminating, he must introduce other evidence, the presentation of 
which is also incriminating. Conversely, if he decides not to present 
other evidence because of its incriminating effect, he must introduce 
his own testimony. The defendant must therefore either forgo a 
defense entirely or make an incriminating presentation of evidence. 
In considering only whether the defendant is compelled to testify, 
the courts have apparently assumed that the defendant would be able 
to construct an adequate defense from other evidentiary sources. 
Thus, one of the factors that appeared to influence the Court to find 
no compulsion in McGautha was the Court's feeling that the defend-
ant was not harmed by his failure to testify since he was able to 
introduce substantial evidence from other sources.121 Although the 
defendant's silence denied him one source of evidence, the Court 
found this ·"cost" constitutionally tolerable. The defendant at a 
revocation hearing, however, must, in order to avoid making incrimi-
nating disclosures to the state, forgo the presentation of any evidence. 
The "cost" to such a defendant is certainly far more substantial than 
it was to the defendant in McGautha. Thus, although the defendant 
at a revocation hearing presents evidence in response to the force of 
In Kasmir, the taxpayer's attorney was faced with a choice between revealing his 
client's secrets or facing sanctions himself. At a revocation hearing, counsel is faced 
with no such choice: the consequences fall only on the defendant. The Court seemed 
to emphasize such a distinction in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972): 
''The summons and the order of the District Court enforcing it are directed against 
the accused's accountant . . . • Inquisitorial pressure or coercion against a poten-
tially accused person, compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning words 
or produce incriminating documents is absent." 409 U.S. at 329. 
118. See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 105 (1st Cir.) (Coffin, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1975); notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See Moore, supra note 117, at 905-10; Note. supra note 111, at 1003 n.5. 
120. See authorities cited in notes 68-70. 
121. See 402 U.S. at 219. 
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the state's case,122 courts should not hesitate to find that such a 
defendant is compelled to disclose evidence to the state in violation of 
his privilege against self-incrimination. 
Upon concluding that the defendant's fifth amendment rights are 
threatened by holding dual proceedings in this context, judicial ana-
lysis should not come to an end. A number of Supreme Court 
rulings on fifth amendment challenges to state procedures indicate 
that courts must assess the relative state and individual interests at 
stake. Although the Court has not always explicitly assessed the state 
interest in a given procedure, and though on some occasions it has 
even suggested that the Constitution does not require the best possible 
procedure, 123 a reading of the cases demonstrates that the nature of 
the state interest has often been a central concern. 
This concern is perhaps most patently manifested in Brady v. 
United States.124 There, the petitioner was accused of violating the 
Federal Kidnapping Act, 125 which provided that only a jury could 
impose .the death penalty; if a defendant pleaded guilty he could at 
most be sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner pleaded 
guilty but later claimed that his plea had been coerced by the Act's 
death penalty provision. After the defendant's plea of guilty but 
prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of his appeal, the Court, 
in United States v. Jackson,126 had invalidated the Act's death penalty 
provision on the ground that imposition of the death penalty only 
upon those who pleaded not guilty unduly encouraged guilty pleas 
and placed an impermissible burden on the exercise of fifth and sixth 
amendment rights.127 Despite the decision in Jackson, the Brady 
122. See notes 92-102 supra and accompanying text. In Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970), a Florida rule of criminal procedure required the defendant to give 
notice in advance of trial if he intended to assert an alibi and to furnish the 
prosecutor with the names of witnesses to be relied upon, as well as the places he 
would claim he had been. In return, the state would supply the defendant with the 
names of any witnesses it intended to use in rebuttal. If a defendant failed to comply 
with the rule, he would not be permitted to introduce the alibi defense at trial. 399 
U.S. at 84. Since criminal defendants ordinarily face this kind of decision, the 
Florida rule "only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, 
forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the 
beginning planned to divulge at trial." 399 U.S. at 85. Therefore, since a defendant 
would disclose an alibi defense because of the force of the state's evidence, the Florida 
rule did not "compel" the production of evidence in violation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. However, this force of the state's evidence argument seems largely 
undercut by Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), discussed in notes 94-97 
supra and accompanying text. Several commentators concur. See Lapides, Cross-
Currents in Prosecutorial Discovery: A Defense Counsel's Viewpoint, 1 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 217, 227-28 (1973); Nakell, supra note 71, at 516 n.382. The holding in 
Williams can be rationalized on other grounds. See text at notes 131, 139 infra. 
123. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,221 (1971). 
124. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
125. Law of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781. 
126. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
127. 390 U.S. at 581-85. 
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Court held that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary even if it 
had been motivated by the threat of the death penalty.128 
Brady thus seems irreconcilable with Jackson. However, the 
Court appears to have been persuaded that the state's important 
interest in maintaining the viability of its whole plea-bargaining 
process would be undermined by a finding that Brady's plea was not 
voluntary, since all bargained-for guilty pleas are motivated at least in 
part by the fear that greater punishment will be imposed if the issue 
of guilt is contested at trial. As the Court emphasized: 
The issue we deal with is inherent in the criminal law . . . because 
guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal 
law characteristically extends to judge or jury a range of choice in 
setting the sentence . . . and because both the State and the defend-
ant often find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of the maxi-
mum penalty authorized by law . . . . It is this mutuality of advan-
tages that perhaps explains the fact that at present well over three-
fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of 
guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by 
the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty . . . .129 
The importance of the state interest in self-incrimination analysis 
is also demonstrated by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Cali-
fornia v. Byers.130 Byers involved a California hit-and-run statute 
that required a driver involved in an accident to stop and give his 
name and address. Petitioner, who had been involved in an accident 
and was prosecuted for failure to comply with the statute, claimed 
that the statute violated his privilege against self-incrimination. A 
plurality of the Court found that the disclosure required by the statute 
would not be incriminating and thus was not protected by the fifth 
amendment. Harlan disagreed: He asserted that the information 
required by the hit-and-run statute was incriminating but that the 
statute was nevertheless justified by its underlying purpose of provid-
ing a system of self-reporting "to ensure financial responsibility for 
accidents and criminal sanctions to deter dangerous driving . . . . 
[1Jhe constitutional values protected by the 'accusatorial' system 
. . . are not of such overriding significance that they compel 
substantial sacrifices in the efficient pursuit of other governmental 
objectives . . . ."131 
When the Court has found the state interest to be relatively 
unimportant, it has not hesitated to invalidate procedures that in-
fringe the defendant's fifth amendment interest. Thus, in first invali-
dating the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, the 
128. 397 U.S. at 749-52. 
129. 397 U.S. at 751-53. 
130. 402U.S.at424 (1971). 
131. 402 U.S. at 448. Although it is not clear from the plurality's opinion, the 
plurality may have also relied on Harlan's argument. See 402 U.S. at 428. 
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Jackson Court noted that the provision's objectives could be fulfilled 
by procedures that did not threaten defendants' constitutional rights. 
It thus held that legitimate objectives "cannot be pursued by means 
that needlessly chill basic constitutional rights."132 Similarly, in 
Brooks, 133 although the incursion on the defendant's fifth amendment 
rights was limited, the Court nevertheless invalidated the statute 
because it vindicated no substantial state interest. The Court noted: 
"It is not altogether clear that the State itself regards [its] interest as 
more than minimally important. It has long been the rule in Tennes-
see that the statute may be waived . . . ."134 
It is of course clear that the state has substantial interests in 
conducting both a revocation hearing and a criminal trial. Yet 
procedures could be adopted that would eliminate the decisional 
pressure placed on the defendant while leaving the state's interests 
unaffected. In particular, the state could accord the defendant at a 
revocation hearing use immunity for all testimony and evidence that 
he presents, thus assuring that none of this evidence, or other evi-
dence derived therefrom, can be utilized by the state in subsequent 
criminal proceedings.135 Moreover, this procedure would be relatively 
costless to the state, since it would allow the state to secure 
information necessary for the effective operation of its conditional 
liberty system and permit it to introduce any evidence at trial that it 
had obtained through its own investigative efforts.136 In fact, the 
state's interest in ensuring just revocation determinations would be 
substantially furthered by encouraging the full participation of de-
fendants in revocation proceedings.137 
There is, however, one state interest that would not be fully 
protected by a grant of use immunity: the state's interest in using the 
revocation proceeding as a discovery device. States may feel that 
using the proceeding in this manner facilitates orderliness and effi-
132. 390 U.S. at 581-83 (emphasis added). 
133. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
134. 406 U.S. at 611 n.7. 
135. See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). At the 
criminal trial, the defendant who has been granted use immunity for his earlier 
testimony demonstrates that the criminal trial relates to the same conduct as the 
revocation proceeding; the state must then show that it derived its evidence from an 
independent, legitimate source. "This burden of proof . . . is not limited to a 
negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove 
that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly 
independent .... " 406 U.S. at 460. 
136. See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 
1289 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975). 
137. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 873, 533 P.2d 1024, 1030, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 384, 390 (1975). The due process right to be heard at a revocation hearing 
extends to explaining mitigating circumstances as well as to denying or defending 
against the state's allegation. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). 
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ciency at trial138 and perhaps deters defendants from fabricating 
evidence.139 Although the state's interest in trial efficiency and 
integrity may justify extensive discovery, use of the revocation pro-
ceeding as a discovery device is an unjustifiably extensive approach: 
The state's interests can be adequately fulfilled by use of more 
narrowly drawn discovery devices aimed only at the evidence that a 
defendant intends to introduce at trial. In sum, since use immunity 
can protect the defendant at a revocation hearing from any infringe-
ment of his fundamental rights without sacrifice to the state's inter-
ests,140' it seems appropriate for courts, on the basis of a "least 
restrictive alternative" analysis, to require states to confer such im-
munity. 
138. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, .ADVISORY COMM. ON PRE-TRIAL PROCEED• 
INGS, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 39-46 
(1970); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279. 
139. This policy may justify the result in Williams. See note 122 supra. 
140. Arguably, reversing the order of the proceedings might also safeguard the 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination without cost to the state since, if the 
revocation hearing follows the trial, the evidence presented at the revocation hearing 
obviously cannot be used at the criminal trial. See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 
105-06 (1st Cir.) (Coffin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); 
AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, supra note 65, § 5.3, at 62-65. In fact, one might argue 
that reversing the order of the proceedings safeguards the defendant's privilege more 
fully than use immunity. Since a defendant will probably know very little about the 
information gathering and assimilating processes of the state, rebutting the state's 
contention that its evidence was independently derived may be difficult. Further, to 
the extent that the revelation of a weak defense at the revocation hearing is deemed a 
testimonial disclosure, see note 105 supra, use immunity will not fully protect the 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 
Of course, reversing the order of the proceedings might still infringe the defend-
ant's privilege against self-incrimination since the evidence presented at the trial could 
also be used at the revocation hearing. However, even assuming that defendant has a 
constitutional right to remain silent at a revocation hearing, but cf. Commonwealth v. 
Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973 ), it is not evident that remaining silent at a 
criminal trial would result in an impermissible penalty. If the defendant remains 
silent at the criminal trial, he is still protected by the restrictive rules of evidence and 
the high burden of proof that obtain in a criminal trial. Cf. United States v. Weber, 
437 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1970). But cf. Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964). 
It is not clear, however, that reversing the order of the proceedings is costless lo 
the state. First, there is the matter of judicial economy. If the revocation hearing is 
held first and the defendant is "acquitted," the state and the defendant may be spared 
a criminal trial by virtue of collateral estoppel. See text at notes 48-54 supra. If the 
order is reversed, an acquittal at trial will not obviate holding a revocation hearing 
because of the difference in the burden of proof required at the two proceedings. See 
note 55 supra and accompanying text. It is true that, if a trial is held first and a 
conviction results, the revocation hearing will be simplified, for no new determination 
of guilt need be made. Nevertheless, a revocation hearing must still be convened lo 
make the discretionary judgment whether the conviction warrants revocation. See 
People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975). 
Second, reversing the order of the proceedings may burden the conditional liberty 
system. The state has an interest in making a speedy determination whether a person 
should remain on conditional liberty. Since a criminal trial probably cannot be held 
as soon as a revocation hearing, delaying the revocation hearing until after the trial 
infringes to some extent the state's interest in a speedy revocation decision. 
